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by Donald Brandon

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

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THE
Commonweal
A Weekly Review of Public Affairs, Literature, and the Arts
THIRTY-FOURTH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

week by week

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND

THE REVOLUTION in Iraq electrified the world, but probably not so much as President Eisenhower's quick decision to send United States troops to the Middle East. Nevertheless, despite the initial shock and anxiety over the possible consequences of this step, almost every American spokesman declared his support for the President's action. Even long-time critics of Administration foreign policy have refrained from tempting "I told you so" recriminations.

Some Congressmen—Republicans as well as Democrats—have registered disagreement with the President's decision, but for the most part the criticism has been carefully muted. In the House, for instance, Speaker Sam Rayburn cut off a Representative who was voicing his disagreement with the President's action. "In times like these," said Mr. Rayburn, "we had better allow matters to develop rather than make remarks about them."

In a sense, of course, Mr. Rayburn was right. There are times of crisis when the national interest demands a cessation of political bickering in favor of a common effort to deal with the emergency. But while "making remarks" seems not a very profitable approach to the formulation of foreign policy, neither does "allowing matters to develop." In fact, it might be said that our present critical position—in the Middle East, in the cold war with the Soviet Union, in the U.N.—is a direct result of just such aimlessness and indecision in the past.

Considering present circumstances only, a pretty good case can be made for the President's sending troops into Lebanon, although the case to be made is not quite the one that was made by the Administration. That Lebanon's independence was "menaced from without" is an assertion which, however true it might be, is unfortunately not supported by much real evidence. The argument that the Lebanese government requested the support of U.S. troops loses a good deal of its force when it is remembered that Lebanon's previous requests for such support were repeatedly denied.

WHY, THEN, should the fall of the pro-Western government in Iraq provoke the sending of U.S. Marines to nearby Lebanon? There is the inescapable question of oil. Three-fourths of Europe's oil comes from the Middle East. If an Arab nationalist uprising should cause this oil to fall under Soviet control, or lead to any serious reduction in the flow of oil to Western Europe, even temporarily, the industrial capacity of free Europe would be dealt a crippling blow. In addition to its oil, the Middle East is of great strategic importance as the hinge of three continents. The collapse of the pro-Western governments there would invite deeper penetration by the Soviets into Africa, as well as Asia and Europe.

But perhaps the strongest argument for a show of United States force was our pledge of support to the government of Lebanon. Failure to stand behind our promises to governments engaged in "our fight" against Communism might have been construed as an abandonment of other pro-Western states in the Middle East. It might have been read by our allies all over the world as an indication of our unwillingness to stand by them in their time of need. Worst of all, it might have been so interpreted by the Soviets, and tempted them to future attempts at expansion.

The strength of most of these arguments, however, is more apparent than real. If the West's supply of Middle Eastern oil was imperiled by the revolution in Iraq and the possibilities of a chain-reaction of similar anti-Western Arab disturbances, there is no reason to believe that oil can be guar-

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anteed by the intervention of Western troops. The same is true of the danger of Russia's moving into a vacuum left by the overthrow of pro-Western governments. Only a massive—and wholly unjustified—military intervention in the area could sufficiently protect Western interests there. The present show of force can only antagonize Arab leaders and weaken whatever power and influence the West previously maintained.

To the question of making good on our pledged word there is no answer, except to deplore the fact that we were permitted to drift into the situation where our choice was limited to such alternatives. We could either go back on our word or proceed on a course known to be impossible of success.

Our position in the Middle East is now weaker, not stronger. The oil so badly needed by the West is farther than ever from Western control. Anti-Western feeling has been inflamed. Whatever moral leadership the United States once exerted, in the Middle East, in the U.N. and throughout the world, has been seriously impaired. If we are not to rely simply on the power of arms, and obviously we are not, there seems no course open to us in the Middle East but withdrawal—sooner or later.

Our basic problem in the Middle East has been the lack of any clear or consistent policy. Confronted by the clash of bitterly opposed interests there, between the Arabs and their mortal enemies the Israelis, the pro-Western feudal lords and the leaders of nationalistic mass-movements, the oil "haves" and "have-nots," we have alternately supported first one and then the other.

There is not much evidence that we have learned anything from our recent history—and there is Thucydides' contention that men never learn from history. But there is also the indestructibility—and necessity—of hope. The United States can and must leave off "allowing matters to develop," must direct itself to a great deal of "making remarks" about its foreign policy ills. And the result of this must be a Middle Eastern commitment which will be not only rational and coherent but true to our nation's conception of itself. A policy which contradicts America's essential beliefs—in freedom, justice and self-determination—can hardly be right, has assuredly not been successful.

HOUSING NEEDS

YEAR IN, year out there is a rough constant of around a million new American housing "starts" that appears to vary slightly with the times. For various and complicated reasons it does not fully reflect such factors as population increases, booms and recessions or upsurges in the establishment of new families when servicemen return from a war. At the moment this figure is rising because of the anti-recession measure Congress passed in March reducing the down payment required with government-financed mortgages. This limited spurt in new houses has proved sufficient to offset the decline in the construction of new manufacturing facilities; it is cited as an unfailing sign of the end of the recession. But it is quite unequal to meeting the present demand for private homes—not to speak of the needs of the immediate future.

Although this may emphasize those areas in the suburbs and the countryside where adequate home facilities are not available for moderate-income families, things are much worse in many American cities. The housing bill recently passed by the Senate places its greatest emphasis on urban renewal, allocating for this purpose some three hundred millions a year for the next six years. Its two and a half billion dollar total is higher than was expected. The House has yet to vote its measure, and the possibility of a veto will act as a restraint upon Congressional leaders when it comes to setting a final figure.

Evidence as to the aggravated housing needs in many of our larger cities is all too plentiful. The very effort of slum clearance usually intensifies the problem. In New York City, for example, where there has been extensive slum demolition since 1950, many families have moved out of condemned tenements into even worse single rooms. The city's Welfare Department has been unable to secure new quarters for most of these families in the various low-rent projects because of their inability to pay certain fees or to meet certain Housing Authority requirements. But there is simply not enough dwelling space to go round. A survey for the New York *Times* finds, for instance, that "it is all but impossible" for the Welfare Department "to get a family of more than four persons into public housing."

Since the most crowded and dilapidated buildings often comprise the only alternative to leaving a family in the streets, a number of slum landlords are profiting heavily. Since a third of all that New York spends on public assistance goes out in the form of rental allowances, the city is actually subsidizing some of its worst slums. Commissioner Henry L. McCarthy sees but one way out: "The only real answer is a rapid expansion of housing—a tremendous expansion that would restore the com-

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petitive situation that existed before the war."

To achieve this in New York and other communities would take some doing. It would mean overcoming the opposition not only of individuals now making a killing from renting to relief clients, but also of the well-organized national real estate lobby. It would necessarily involve more efficient and economical construction methods, including lower labor costs. It would necessitate more thorough and continuing local and regional planning. But first of all it would require a public awakened and concerned over the human and social cost of our present neglect.

THE "LITTLE" LIST

A RECENT ruling by the Justice Department of the United States may do much to change the status of what has become almost a fixture in American life. For over a decade now, political life in this country has been marked by the presence of several "little lists." The intrinsically innocuous phrase, "a little list," has come to assume, over the years, an aura of the sinister and the subversive. For the patriotism and integrity of people and organizations on "a little list" were called into question. Often with no direct accusations or charges they were regarded with suspicion—by employers, government officials, the armed forces, acquaintances and the general press. For these people the traditional legal maxim was reversed to read "Guilty, until proven innocent." Most frequently, however, there was nothing resembling a trial in which guilt or innocence could be established. The list constituted a kind of charge, but there was no ready way in which the charge could be countered.

One of these lists—probably the most important and influential—is the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. Behind the original conception of this list there is a recognizable and acceptable rationale. The list was to include the names of organizations which could be classified as subversive. The list was intended to warn the unwary and to inform the untutored; it was, in other words, to be used as a guide.

As not infrequently happens in such matters, the practice diverged noticeably from the theory. The specifications to be met before an organization was put on the list were rather elastic. As the list grew, it grew less discriminating. It contained names of groups that asserted allegiance to Fascism or to the Communist Party. But it also listed "front" groups, "paper" groups that were never actually organized, groups that contained Communist sympathizers, and groups that were militantly anti-Communist. And it ceased to be thought of as a guide for the politically unsophisticated. It was soon tantamount to a proven charge, and the people connected with any organization on the list were not only open to harassment but often to the loss of privileges that were enjoyed by their fellow citizens.

Now—and for the first time, apparently—an organization has fought to a conclusion the issue of its listing on the Attorney General's list. And, after ten years of legal battles, it has vindicated its contention. The Justice Department has, therefore, dropped from its list the Workers Party; its successor, the Independent Socialist League; and its affiliate, the Socialist Youth League. The decision reads in part: "The Attorney General . . . is not satisfied that the evidence adduced at the hearings meets the strict standards of proof which should guide the determination of proceedings of this character." According to Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., the attorney for the organization, "the outcome in this case is a clear demonstration of the uselessness of the Attorney General's list."

Even those who will not wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Rauh must question the "strict standards" which will list an organization for so many years without sufficient evidence. And if it can happen to a single organization, why not another? But if the list places organizations which may meaningfully be described as subversive alongside quite legitimate groups, does it not confuse several issues? And, to continue the line of questioning, if the list adds to, rather than dissipates, the political confusion of our time, has it not foregone its original purpose of being a helpful guide?

DR. EISENHOWER'S MISSION

THE DISTURBANCES that marked Vice President Nixon's Latin American tour came as a shock partly because they were so much at variance with the welcomes accorded to most other visitors from the United States in recent years. Since that stormy visit of several months ago, several artistic and cultural representatives from this country have been warmly acclaimed in South America, while Representative Porter of Washington, leader in the effort to obtain satisfaction from Dictator Trujillo in the Galindez case, recently received in Venezuela what was akin to a hero's welcome. Those who demonstrated so violently against

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Mr. Nixon had apparently been persuaded that he was a symbol of North American oil interests, and identified with those tariff and quota measures which were impairing the economic well-being and independence of the hard-pressed Latin American peoples. However much Communist agitators had to do with provoking these outbursts, genuine personal and national grievances were involved.

The object of Dr. Milton Eisenhower's current trip is to seek out the greatest needs of each of the various nations in Central America. This is a good start. Several of our leading financial and economic experts, themselves government officials, are accompanying him on this three-weeks goodwill mission. Fact-finding will range from specific national agricultural surpluses to funds required for various development projects. In Panama, the first stop, Finance Minister Fernando Eleta is reported by the *Christian Science Monitor* to have stressed his country's need of loans for hydroelectric installations—even above funds for school construction or roads for transport.

Awareness of the needs and concerns of the other Americas has seldom seemed more essential. The Eisenhower journey is primarily important as a gesture toward restoring goodwill lost through our lack of interest in the peoples of Latin America and measures harmful to their raw-material economies. The amount of information the visit itself will unearth is problematical, particularly in view of the customary diplomatic courtesies and the sketchy character of a mission that takes in all Central America, with a brief side trip to Puerto Rico. If this initial gesture can soon be followed up by lesser missions on specific projects, the amount of useful information could be considerable. No other nation is in a better position than ours to make the trade adjustments and extend the loans of the type the Latin American countries need—or to send the required technicians. And no other nation has greater reason to do so.

CURBING THE COURT

IN RECENT years the Supreme Court has been faced with many complex cases. In many of these cases it was immediately evident that the Court decision would have profound and lasting effect. For the cases involved issues whose roots extended deep into the past. The present Court responded forthrightly to the challenge which our times posed. It passed on cases involving crucial issues of civil rights and of civil liberties. As could have been foretold, many of the decisions were severely criticized, and the criticism ranged from the reasonable and sensible to what was patently biased and scurrilous.

Although the present Court has been termed "liberal" with some justification, it has, and most noticeably in the area of civil liberties, performed its historic function of acting as a conservative force. Less immediately subject to the rise and fall of public opinion than are the legislative and executive branches, it has asserted established codes against attitudes and feelings that are strong, meaningful but relatively ephemeral.

That this historic role of the Court is not always recognized or welcomed by those whom it chastens is clear from a recent piece of legislation passed by the House of Representatives. Allegedly to protect States' rights, the measure would prevent Federal laws from superseding state laws on the same subject unless the Federal statute specifically said so, or unless they were in irreconcilable opposition.

If this bill, with its vague wording, were to be enacted, the present admittedly difficult Federal-state relationships would be utterly confused. For the bill would undo, in vital areas of our national life, vast areas of legislation that have been enacted and tested over many years.

More than anything else, the bill is a criticism of the Supreme Court and its recent decisions. Now that the criticism has been duly noted the irresponsible bill has performed its only useful, if dubious, purpose. We hope that it will be allowed to pass quietly away.

MADE TO ORDER

EVEN in its Madison Avenue, success-oriented, ulcer-producing aspects, there is much to admire in the "American way." Having made that bow, we call attention to another aspect that is a dizzying distance from the desirable.

Two American insurance men, from places as distant as West Hartford, Connecticut, and Star, Idaho, have declared delightedly that they have been doing a great business. And they are, according to one of them, only "following the President's instructions. Give them a hard sell to cure that recession." "The situation is made to order," says the other.

In order to do their bit to fight the recession these men have even had to leave their home towns. For they are busy selling "battle policies" to U.S. Marines and paratroopers. Place of business? Beirut.

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Failures of Containment
Negative Foreign Policy

The United States response to change in recent years has been both unrealistic and unimaginative

by DONALD BRANDON

SINCE THE RUSSIANS sent their sputniks into orbit and claimed development of an I.C.B.M., Western Europe and the neutral nations of Africa and Asia have been conducting their own "agonizing reappraisal" of the relative strengths of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and of their own position in the cold war struggle between the two superpowers. Among the obvious results of this analysis have been excited agitation for disengagement, in England and on the continent, and increased conviction in the neutral countries regarding their policy of non-alignment with the West against the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union has capitalized on the situation by propagandizing for a summit conference, by issuing more and more confident challenges to "competitive coexistence," and by unilaterally renouncing further nuclear tests, provided the United States and Britain likewise cease testing.

The United States response to the evident change in the military distribution of power and to the loss of confidence and prestige among allies and neutrals alike has been both unrealistic and unimaginative. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles have persuaded the American people, whose complacency they fostered, that U.S. military supremacy remains intact and that the overall American position in the world has not deteriorated. But they have not convinced allied and neutral governments or peoples. The Administration's involved and wounded replies to the Soviet Union's messages concerning a summit meeting, as well as the poorly enunciated though defensible American posture on nuclear testing, have only increased allied and neutral disaffection with America's role in the cold war. American influence and prestige have thus reached an all-time low in the postwar period.

Mr. Brandon recently returned to the faculty of the University of San Francisco after three years of government service, here and abroad.

The unfavorable position of the United States in world affairs is not, however, solely the result of recent events. Perceptive observers have been pointing out for several years that the Soviet successors to Stalin have been making significant gains in the diplomatic, economic and psychological arenas of international politics, as well as rapidly overcoming the nuclear advantage of the United States. The current situation has merely highlighted trends which have been discernible since the conclusion of the Korean and Indochinese wars. What we are witnessing today is widespread recognition—except, perhaps, by the United States Government—that the West is in danger of losing the cold war under American leadership.

It is significant that George Kennan, the author of America's postwar policy of containment, has shown awareness of the increase in Soviet strength and prestige and of the decline of the Western position. Mr. Kennan's Reith lectures on "Russia, The Atom and the West," and in particular his plea for consideration of disengagement in Central Europe, have been widely discussed in this country and abroad. But the central implication of these lectures has gone unnoticed, namely, Kennan's abandonment of the hope he expressed in 1947 that ten or fifteen years of containment would result in a weakening of the Soviet regime, a change in Russian intentions and a more normal relationship between the Communist and Western worlds.

IN THE REITH lectures, Mr. Kennan discussed each of the specific assumptions regarding Russia upon which the policy of containment was based. And, without referring to the predictions he made in his famous "Mr. X" article, he conceded in effect that his forecast has not been borne out. The Soviets have thus far managed to surmount the difficult problem of the succession to Stalin; they have not only overcome the tremendous destruction of World War II but have gone on

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to overtake the United States in most areas of military strength; while they still face great difficulties in the agricultural sector of their economy, the standard of living of the Russian masses has slowly improved, and the Soviets have undertaken an ambitious program of foreign aid in the uncommitted areas in addition to their assistance to Communist China. The Soviet Union has serious problems, both at home and abroad, but after more than a decade of containment Russia is stronger, not weaker; Khrushchev speaks confidently of "burying" or "reeducating" capitalists after the anticipated Communist victory over the West.

The Soviet regime has obviously not mellowed, and the Russian intervention in Hungary and the current resurgence of the Stalinist line in the Kremlin show that de-Stalinization is basically only propaganda. The essential nature of the system remains intact, despite a certain element of relaxation which observers and visitors alike have reported. But the most hopeful possibility which Mr. Kennan suggested in 1947—that the Soviet system contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction—is still apparently relied upon by the Republican Administration, for John Foster Dulles reiterates this belief in nearly every major policy statement. Either the regime will become more liberalized in time or it will collapse because it is an affront to human dignity and the freedoms which peoples everywhere cherish, according to the Secretary of State.

Nevertheless, although the present situation is on balance favorable to the Soviet Union rather than to the U.S. and the West, and although the hopes of Mr. Kennan in 1947 have proven illusory, it is not fair to condemn the policy of containment outright. It is rather the execution and, even more important, the limitations of the postwar American policy spelled out by Mr. Kennan which are at fault. Containment posited the erection of Western military strength as a deterrent to Soviet overt aggression, but as Mr. Kennan elaborated the doctrine the problem of Russia and International Communism was not seen as basically military. Armed strength was viewed as a necessary but negative requirement, a shield behind which the United States could act positively for the creation of a politically and economically healthy and stable non-Communist world, a world which would be able to resist Soviet blandishments as well as threats. It may be conjectured that Mr. Kennan's current poetic vision, of America winning the cold war primarily by setting a moral example, is the result of an extreme and emotional reaction to the overmilitarization of the Truman and Eisenhower policies.

IN TERMS OF territory and peoples, containment has been by and large successful. It is unlikely that the loss of China to Communism could have been prevented save by all-out American participation on the side of Chiang Kai-shek in the late forties or reversed save by expansion of the Korean War in the early fifties, at the risk of starting World War III in both cases—a chance which was wisely not taken. Eastern Europe was lost when the Red Army overran the area during the closing months of the second world war, and it is not certain that a Balkan second front could have prevented the debacle. Apart from these major extensions of Communist control, there is only the loss of North Viet Nam, counterbalanced by the defection of Tito from the Communist bloc in 1948. The Iron and Bamboo Curtains remain about where they were when the policy of containment was decided upon—after it was too late to alter the effects of our East European and Chinese policies during the crucial years of World War II.

It is not, of course, the challenge of Communist military aggression which is the focal point of current comment by American and overseas critics of the foreign policy of the United States, although many are rightly concerned at the relative decline in Western military strength. It is Soviet strength and prestige at home and abroad, and the extension of Russian influence into the Near and Far East, Africa and even Latin America which appalls and frightens observers in Europe and the U.S.

There is, moreover, the fact that not only have the Soviets managed to match American nuclear power and to outdistance the U.S. in the development of missiles, they have succeeded in many parts of the world in convincing governments and peoples that it is the U.S. and the Western alliance which threatens to provoke World War III. Russia has managed to make it appear that the U.S.S.R. has the best interests of humanity at heart, and that it is the "capitalistic" world which is responsible for the cold war and its almost unbearable tensions. It is not the past record of successful checkmating of Communist aggression, but the future prospect of losing the world struggle—either without firing a shot or as a result of a surprise nuclear assault by the Soviets—that concerns critics of current American foreign policy.

On all four fronts of the cold war—military, diplomatic, economic and psychological—the Soviet regime has the initiative, and the U.S.-led free world is on the defensive. America has used poorly the non-military instruments of foreign policy, as well as neglecting military requirements in recent years. Allies and neutrals alike are losing confidence in America's capacity to deal with the complex challenge of the Communist bloc and the contemporary world, and the advocates of "Fortress America" have been emboldened by the current frustration. The policy of containment has weaknesses, but the answer to these deficiencies does not lie in isolation. It lies rather in the revival of a conception of America's role in world affairs

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which has been falsely discredited because of the unrealistic expectations of earlier adherents.

James Burnham was as right in his criticism of the negative character of containment as he was wrong in his advocacy of a policy of liberation which could only have ended in total nuclear war if it had been followed by the United States. Containment, both in theory and practice, is essentially a policy of reaction to Soviet pressure. As Mr. Burnham argued in *Containment or Liberation* and as the record shows, the policy followed by the United States leaves the initiative in the hands of the Communist bloc and places the free world in the position of responding to Soviet moves at times and places chosen by the Russians. It was almost inevitable that such a policy would degenerate into mere anti-Communism in the hands of the present Administration, for its leaders from President Eisenhower on down have shown little or no conception of a positive foreign policy. But while the Republicans can be legitimately censured for their conduct of affairs, the defensive policy of containment which they inherited is not a satisfactory guide for America in the second half of the twentieth century.

For the age of conflict, which began in 1914 and has not yet run its course, is a transitional one in which an old order is passing and a new one is struggling to be born. Moreover, the technological revolution of our time has made possible the creation of one world for the first time in history. The basic issue is whether the nations and peoples of the world shall be united by force or by consent. Either the Communist bloc will succeed in organizing a world despotism or America will lead the nations toward a free, pluralist association which respects the religions, cultures, and legitimate political and economic systems of the peoples of the world. The final form of this association of nations and peoples in freedom can be debated, and the road to realization of such a world is long and difficult. But though Woodrow Wilson was naive in his expectations following World War I and Franklin Roosevelt was also overly optimistic in his hopes concerning the current postwar world, they were both right in their conception of America's destiny to lead the nations of the world toward recognition of the international common good. America must recapture its vision of a world order based on freedom and justice without losing sight of realities and the obstacles barring the path to its practical realization.



Military victory and diplomatic defeat in two world wars, together with the partially valid realist critique of interwar idealism in theory and practice, have undermined traditional American confidence in the future of the nation and of mankind. While the nineteenth century conception of inevitable progress was obviously false, and American innocence was bound to be destroyed by contact with problems of maturity at home and totalitarianism abroad, the currently fashionable pessimism and pseudo-sophistication have robbed the United States of the will and vision to lead the free world successfully. No one can be certain that mankind will escape the dreaded nuclear catastrophe, but the ever-present possibility of that conflagration and the necessity of military preparedness dare not deter the United States from the positive diplomatic and economic policies which are indispensable to the wresting of the initiative from the Communist bloc in the contemporary world.

The United States destroyed its moral position after World War I by reverting to an impossible diplomatic isolationism, and America has endangered its leadership in the current situation by following largely negative and simply anti-Communist policies. Although the revolutionary turmoil of the postwar world lends itself to exploitation by the Communist bloc, the foreign policy successes of Russia and Red China are attributable more to the failure of the United States to stand for a positive conception of the world which is emerging than to the appeal of the Communist solution to the problems of the mid-twentieth century. In particular, while the challenges confronting the billion people of the Near East, Africa, the Far East and Latin America would exist even if there were no cold war, the conflict between America and Russia makes it imperative that the image of the United States as the leader in the struggle for a better world, which formerly existed in these areas, be restored. The United States would not need to fear Communist capture of the genuine revolutions in the underdeveloped nations if America reassumed its traditional role as the leader of the positive revolution in world affairs.

WALTER LIPPMANN pointed out as long ago as 1947, in *The Cold War,* that containment assumed America would live up to its highest traditions and that the Soviet Union would decline in power and prestige. While neither premise has been realized, it is probable that the Communist bloc would in time abandon its fanatical efforts to subvert the free world if the latter were so strong, morally, politically and econom-

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ically, that neither the carrot nor the stick could affect it. And if Communism were literally contained in its own sphere, there would be some grounds for hope of its liberalization or disintegration. American resistance, as in Korea, and the "balance of terror" are likely to deter Communist military aggression for the foreseeable future, provided the Western nations develop the capacity to fight limited war. But the non-military techniques of Communist expansion cannot be blunted so long as the United States fails to support, and even encourage, the legitimate aspirations of allied and neutral nations alike.

It is often noted that the United States and the Western powers lack an effective counter-strategy in the struggle with international communism. It may be impossible for the Grand Alliance to match the unity, crusading fervor, and techniques of the enemy, but if the United States were to readopt its historic position as the advocate of freedom and self-determination of peoples the ideological initiative could be reclaimed. Most of the peoples of the world, whether in allied, neutral or Communist lands, seek the kind of world which the United States has traditionally championed. But America has become identified in the minds of peoples the world over with a purely military response to the problems of the age as a result of foreign policies based on a one-sided interpretation of containment.

Reassumption of its historic role would not enable American foreign policy makers to resolve every issue confronting them in today's complex world on a "scientific" or mathematical basis. The United States attitude toward European-colonial problems, for example, cannot be logically deduced from the principle of self-determination, for that standard can be claimed by both the participants in the conflict. Nevertheless, the mere fact of proclaiming anew its support of a pluralist world based on an association of nations in freedom, as opposed to Communism's efforts to impose a massive totalitarian system, would give the United States new respect and prestige in Western European and in neutral nations. Moreover, restoration of faith that the future belongs to freedom and not to slavery would enable America to formulate diplomatic and economic policies on its own initiative rather than merely react to international Communism's specific challenges.

It is probable that the breakup of the international bi-polarity which has developed in the last few years will be accelerated in the future. The increased spirit of independence on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe, currently manifested by the return to power of de Gaulle in France and by Soviet-Yugoslav tensions, challenges both Washington's and Moscow's conception of solid camps in the cold war struggle. America must make the most of the flexible situation which is emerging, for the days of free world and Communist bloc solidarity are over. West Germany and Japan are certain to become more independent in their attitudes and policies toward Russia and Red China respectively as they regain their military power and prestige. On the other hand, it is long past time for the U.S. to begin developing policies which exploit the present and latent conflicts of interest between Moscow and Peiping. America must abandon the false premises of containment if she is to cope successfully with the challenges and opportunities presented by allied and Communist bloc flexibility and by the national and social revolutions taking place in the underdeveloped areas.

The policy of containment has failed to prevent the expansion of Communist power and prestige at home and abroad. The United States obviously must do what is required to restore its military position if Communist aggression is successfully to be deterred or defeated in the future. But while neither general nor local war can be ruled out, it is clear that the major immediate threat to the entire free world lies in the non-military areas of foreign affairs. There are many obstacles to American leadership of the complex free world of allied and neutral nations, but the U.S. cannot hope to see the kind of world it seeks unless it abandons the sterile interpretation and limitations of the present policy of containment, unless it reasserts its historic vision of international progress based on self-determination and freedom.

RADIATED MAN

The quirking rubber wheels slide him under
The beneficent huge machine.
Sentient patient of medicinal line,
Angle, dial, knob, lever,
Joint, periscope-something; untender
Metal: gray, white, black, gray, white, foreverever.

The white-squared ceiling, like an upside-down
Enormous plaza, winter empty,
Blindly paves his sky.
The thing's articulated bone
Descends, clamps him, deeply drones,
Retracts. By which not love nor hate is shown.

And he sets frantically over him (lest all should harden)
An arch of colored vapor,
Touches the humid throats of flowers;
Recalls the flesh of sleep-drunken children;
Also globes of wet rhododendron.
And that the proper place of crisis is a garden.

JOSEPHINE JACOBSEN.

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The rich, powerful and notably indifferent United States has been a natural target for criticism

Anti-Americanism in Canada?

by JOHN E. BELLIVEAU

SPEAKING ABOUT the undefended U.S.-Canadian border in a recent address, Governor General Vincent Massey, a non-political figure who often makes very wise remarks, said this: "Our frontier has long been immune from conflict, it is true, but it has suffered grievously from the effects of rhetoric." For some months now the frontier has been undergoing a bombardment of rhetoric it hasn't known since Canadian Tories were shouting foolishly "no truck or trade with the Yankees" in the Reciprocity Treaty election of 1911. The Canadian noise hasn't been without some foundation, but it is no more serious and no more logical than the outrageous and insincere suggestion of 1911.

Canadians know now, as they knew then, that they could no more survive without "Yankee truck and trade" than could coconut palms within the Arctic Circle. But they have within the last decade alone experienced a growth and development which is probably without parallel in the Western world at any time in history. Since World War II the country's population has increased by almost half of its then total. Its industry has expanded beyond the wildest dreams of 1940, and its development of resources and discovery of hidden riches have been nothing short of fantastic.

This phenomenon has, of course, attracted hundreds of millions in United States capital. It has brought American subsidiary industries to Canada in droves, as it has brought American citizens themselves. And it has at the same time created a bursting pride in achievement that, like the excitement of a small boy with his first bicycle, has to find some outlet. The big, rich, powerful and notably indifferent United States has been a natural target.

The fundamental source of the current disenchantment with the United States is that as important, prosperous and strong the nation to the north has become, the Americans just take it for granted. They pay so little attention that it hurts. Because Canadians are conservative, stable, unexcitable people, because we have had no revolutions, riots, assassinations or civil wars, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. public try to soothe us with "undefended border" platitudes and benign pats on the head.

Because we have made our way for a very long time, because we have developed an independent nation and become an important one (the world's third largest trading nation), there is a conviction that our most immediate neighbors should know something about us and our affairs. It seems natural that we should be almost as familiar with U.S. affairs as with our own, and it also seems reasonable that our neighbors know something about us and our problems. Yet we are faced with such a profound ignorance of even our most prominent concerns, and with such studied indifference, that it irks to the point of wrath.

WHEN OUR oil exports are cut back severely because a lobby in the United States finds it temporarily more profitable, it hurts, but it doesn't seriously affect our economy. When U.S. wheat is dumped abroad at fire-sale prices, the effect on Canada's prairies is severe, but it is not nationally crippling. When industrial subsidiaries take orders from U.S. home offices that adversely affect our business policies, there is real injury, but it is not vital. Yet all these things and many others injure our pride to a very marked degree.

Then there are the character assaults by the U.S. Internal Security Subcommittee on respected and responsible Canadian citizens like Robert Bryce, secretary to the Canadian cabinet, and Ambassador Herbert Norman, who killed himself. Almost all Canadians are angered by the smears and the insult to national pride in the implication that our own security forces are not capable of or adequate to the job of keeping our own house clean.

On the other hand, to suggest that Canadian grievances with the United States have reached a state of out and out anti-Americanism is to exaggerate the importance of the handful of "little Englanders" in Canada, who for political or nationalistic reasons are capitalizing on this issue.

Nor is the case improved by such extreme statements as that of Mr. Carey McWilliams in the *Nation* recently. He asks: "Must Canadians riot in the streets

Mr. Belliveau is a columnist for the Toronto *Daily Star*. This is his first appearance in The Commonweal.

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of Ottawa and Montreal before we will take their grievances seriously?" And then he comments: "Yes, those Canadian riots may be nearer than we think."

This is simply nonsense. Most Canadians appreciate how important United States trade and investment are to their nation, and it is a small minority that has stirred up the anti-American noise for its own purposes. George Mowbray, a Canadian economist, has charged it to "some who might be called 'half-transplanted' journalists," referring to the "Little Englanders." And he adds: "One cannot resist the suspicion that an Old World anti-Americanism born of envy and frustration is looking for new Canadian roots. A sloppy sentimentality towards Britain is not, as far as I and a good many other Canadians are concerned, the kind of thing we need to develop a nationally independent culture."

There has been, in fact, within the last decade a heavy immigration into Canada of a professional and intellectual class of British. A few of these, in a few concentrated places, have had an effect out of all proportion to their numbers because of their connection with journalism and broadcasting. The "older" Canadians, and some of us have actually been here since 1608, are a conservative crowd, content with our situation, happy about the long and thoroughly established U.S. relationship and satisfied with our inherited British parliamentary and judicial systems. Even the French Canadians accept these British institutions happily and contentedly.

IT IS TRUE that the federated Canada of today developed out of a straggling and separated group of colonies and became a nation partly through fear of the military power of the new Union Government in the United States after the Civil War. But even so, another fact remains: Canada, even historically, is more American than it is British, though it is truly neither. Its biggest and wealthiest province of Ontario, a geographical region in which Texas could be tucked away and not even noticed, is "American" in substance. After the early exploring and fur-trading French had gone, there were small British garrisons here and there in the province and a tiny administrative group. But the population came from northern U.S. land-seekers and from "Loyalists" who fled northward at the time of the American Revolution.

Aside from the Acadians who remained after the 1755 expulsion, the basic population groups to settle the Atlantic provinces, "the Maritimes," in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were likewise Loyalists and Yankees. And, like their compatriots in Ontario, most of their travel exchange is with the nearby United States.

The western prairie provinces are heavily peopled by settlers who moved into the wheatlands from bordering states. And while the Pacific coast giant of a province, British Columbia, has been more "British" in population, its natural movement and trade are with the Pacific states. West of the Rockies, it is cut off, almost like another nation, by the mountains; its social relationship is with the United States.

Only Quebec and Newfoundland are without this kind of American influence, yet from Quebec for generations has flowed a stream of people into New England so that the intercourse is constant and familiar. In this case, Quebec may be said to have influenced the U.S., because in bordering areas of several states, Maine, New Hampshire and New York, the French language and customs have penetrated to a degree few Americans would realize. Historically, French Canada was on the verge of joining with the American revolutionaries and several excursions were made into Canada by the Vermont Allen boys seeking support.

Benjamin Franklin and his associates went to Montreal to stir up interest and gained much sympathy, but the Quebecers, after their conquest by the British, had their religion and language so well protected by the conquerors that they feared to be swallowed up by the giant of a nation about to be born, and they resisted.

Newfoundland has had a close relationship with the U.S. only through the armed forces which have occupied bases on that island since World War II. But then Newfoundland, the last province in the Canadian federation, is almost as distinct from the rest of Canada as it is from the United States.

And yet, having said all this, Canada has developed independently as a nation and with marked differences from the United States. In temperament, for instance, Canadians are most unlike the Americans. They are not gamblers; they have a complex which makes them hesitate to invest in their own progress, and their wealth is often poured into other countries. The extent, incidentally, of Canadian investment in the U.S. is far greater than ordinarily thought. They have millions in Florida real estate, for example; Canadian insurance companies do a huge business in the U.S.; Canadian railroads have major operations within the United States; a Canadian owns the American Eversharp Company; one of the five highest income individuals in North America is a Canadian liquor tycoon who does most of his business in the U.S.; beer and soft drink companies are controlled in Canada, as are a variety of other kinds of business and industry.

Of course, a major distinction is the continuing connection with the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth. The Canadian institutions of parliament and the judiciary are British-derived; the educational systems are fundamentally British and French (Deweyism never got very far in Canada). But probably Canada's most notable distinction from the United States is ethnic and religious. One-third of Canada is French. The ninety per cent French Quebec

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is eighty-five per cent Catholic and Canada as a whole is more than forty per cent Catholic. This itself colors the nation and creates a philosophy quite different from that of the United States.

Because of the different religious balance, there has always been a different relationship between Catholic and Protestant than obtained in the U.S. American Puritan Protestantism never existed in Canada, save in a few little pockets.

Quebec, of course, gives Canada an old-Europe cast that has no counterpart in the United States, not even in Louisiana. The French are in many parts of Canada, but the Quebec French were and remain Latins. They are pre-revolutionary French, yet more Canadian than any others, having only their language and monarchial Catholicism from France.

Within the last decade, heavy European immigration has begun a marked change in Canada, especially in English Canada. Toronto, once a provincial Protestant-English and Irish enclave, has become proportionately almost as cosmopolitan as New York. Italians and Germans are the largest of the new elements, and they, with a new type of Briton and heavy concentrations of Ukrainians and Hungarians among the dozens of new peoples, have already changed the character of the city. This has happened in lesser degree in other cities and rural areas. But while the melting pot theory has flourished in the United States, it is a long way from acceptance in Canada. French Canada does not accept it at all. Quebec wants Canada to remain a bi-cultural country (English and French are, of course, both official languages) and though English Canada has in the past resisted this, plumping for one English culture, it has in recent years been coming around to the dualistic idea. What both the major elements of traditional Canada have and want to retain is a Canadian Canada.

ANOTHER MAJOR POINT of difference between the two American nations is the fact that Canada's population is and always has been thinly stretched across a narrow border strip from Atlantic to Pacific. It has no depth, and while the vast northern territories exist, there has been relatively little development of them. This is changing slowly as vast northern resources are being opened up, but it will be a long time before much population moves into the less hospitable areas.



Of Canada's vast land mass, only about one-eighth is arable land. Even with present means of making land productive agriculturally, Canada has used up most of its good farm land. The growth of recent years has come from woods and mineral resources and from a swiftly developing industrial economy. To be prosperous, therefore, and Canada has indeed been highly prosperous, the nation must export heavily. Its biggest market is the United States, and what has alarmed Canadians is the fact that fewer than 17,000,000 people are spending a billion dollars a year more in the United States than Americans are spending in Canada.

Since Canada happens also to be United States' largest foreign market, and Canadians pay for their goods in hard cash (never having borrowed anything from the U.S.), there is a natural feeling of injury when United States trading policies have seriously adverse effects on Canada. And it was believed, more so in the U.S. than in Canada, that the Conservative's huge majority in the last election resulted because they exploited this currently popular theme.

The truth was close to what a Liberal M.P. from Quebec, Augustin Brassard, said in the House of Commons last spring. He chided Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Conservative government for "giving the U.S. the boot while kissing it on both cheeks." He said it had aroused ill-feeling in the U.S. because of "hasty and ambiguous" trade switch proposals. But, he said, the same government was "bending backwards to accommodate the U.S. by letting a U.S. air force general control Canadian air defense squadrons."

Ivan B. White, the U.S. consul general in Toronto, said in a speech recently that Canadians seemed to be apprehensive about some aspects of American-financed rapid development; about what they considered the failure of some American-controlled subsidiaries to bear a fair share of community philanthropies; about inadequate efforts of American subsidiaries to train Canadians for advancement to executive positions. And, finally, they complained that Canadians have inadequate opportunity to invest in the shares of U.S.-owned subsidiaries in Canada. He then answered all these objections, and a half-dozen audiences hearing the same speech in different places astonished him by their enthusiastic applause in his favor. These reactions, it seems to me, suggest that what Canadians want is neither excessive nor hard to understand.

We in Canada have no desire to be anything but Canadians, not "Americans" and certainly not "Britons"; and the French Canadians have no desire whatever to be French in the modern European sense. We want recognition simply as Canadians.

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THE SCREEN

UNIFORM IN UNIFORM

WHEN MOVIEMAKERS hit on a lucrative cycle, they are likely to run it to the ground. There have been some interesting and provocative war movies this year ("The Young Lions," "Paths of Glory," "The Key") but several new items in the war category would indicate that this cycle, now tired and tiring, is already grounded. "A Time To Love and a Time To Die," handsomely filmed in Germany in Eastman Color and CinemaScope, has plenty of rubble and ruin to show what its young hero, a disillusioned soldier, came home to when on leave. Nevertheless, the film has a studio air that doesn't match its authentic backgrounds. This is at least partly due to Orin Jannings' talky and tedious script that concentrates heavily on a bitter-sweet romance between the hero, who is looking for his parents in the bombed city, and a young woman whose father was yanked off to a concentration camp for saying the war was lost. And part of the reason is traceable to Douglas Sirk's direction of his large cast, none of whom comes through very effectively in this study of crumbling Germany in 1944.

A good-looking newcomer, John Gavin, plays the lead role; and while he tries earnestly enough, he doesn't have the command or training to project the lost young German who is sickened by S.S. brutalities and the horrors of war. His performance is simple and unexaggerated, but there is too much of Hollywood in his manner. Unfortunately this is also true of Lilo Pulver, an attractive Swiss actress who attains a certain poignancy as the unhappy girl who falls in love with Gavin and marries him during his furlough; but she too, although her training is Continental, has the Hollywood stamp. So do Keenan Wynn, Jock Mahoney and Don DeFore, all friends of the disenchanted hero. And, to continue the list, so do Thayer David, Dorothea Wieck, and Kurt Meisel, all portraying fanatic and villainous Nazis.

Erich Maria Remarque, from whose novel the film derives, appears in the cast as Gavin's former teacher who tries to strengthen his belief in God, ease his feelings of guilt and persuade him to assume responsibility. But this aspect is slighted in this definitely downbeat film. "A Time to Love and a Time To Die" spends so much time with the romantic young couple that it doesn't achieve much depth even though it tries to contrast their hopeful groping with the decay and smell of defeat that surrounds them. One of the most effective scenes shows Gavin taking Lilo to a plush cellar restaurant where well-heeled Germans gorge themselves. The prevalent attitude is well stated: "Enjoy the war, my friends; the peace will be awful." Fear and death are the dominant notes, and the film ends, as did Remarque's famous 1930 movie, "All Quiet on the Western Front," with the hero being shot as he reaches out for something representing hope and beauty.

AMONG THE new war movies, none is more tired and tiring than "The Naked and the Dead." The finished result of producer Paul Gregory's efforts has caught little of Norman Mailer's carefully plotted story, which concentrated on action on a Pacific island held by the Japanese; nor has it Mailer's characterization of the American fighting men whose varied home towns and backgrounds accounted for their thinking. The script, written by Terry Sanders, uses only a few flashbacks and depends more on talk than on action to convey the moods. And Director Raoul Walsh, who has a good cast at his disposal, turns the characters into types instead of real people—types who make the same points over and over until the picture seems more like an illustrated educational lecture than a movie intended to entertain.

A single flashback which shows Aldo Ray confronting his unfaithful wife attempts to explain why this sergeant hates mankind and is such a brutal sadist. And an even more feeble flashback shows Cliff Robertson entangled with a series of lovely girls; but this hardly explains why this lieutenant is so liberal in his ideas or why, when he becomes the general's aide, he speaks up against special privileges for officers. His argument gets nowhere with the general (Raymond Massey), a petty martinet who becomes overwhelmed with his sense of power. In one of his more hateful, authoritarian moods, the general spitefully puts the lieutenant in charge of a dangerous reconnoitering mission. There is a conflict then between the sergeant and the lieutenant. Until he is wounded he is able to keep the tough sergeant in line, but while he is being carried back to the landing beach, the sergeant takes over and forces the remaining five men to continue reconnoitering the enemy's rear. Director Walsh is at his best in this part of the film, and many of these scenes, which were photographed in Panama, are truly outstanding.

But unfortunately the good parts of "The Naked and the Dead" cannot compensate for its many faults. The film is badly edited and motivations are not always clear. The characterizations are sketchy, not especially interesting and do not measure up to a serious consideration of war's evils. After building up the charge that army life brings out the worst in men, the film winds up with the lieutenant delivering a speech saying the general was all wrong: the two men who carried him through those eighteen miles of torturous jungle were prompted not by fear but by love; the

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spirit of man is good and eternal; and listen, sir, for whom the bell tolls. . . .

MAYBE IT'S only when making serious war films that American producers are so tired. Their war comedies can still be lively, and "Imitation General," the latest effort to point out how snarled up the army can get, is the funniest picture of this type to come along since "Operation Madball." Glenn Ford plays a master sergeant who thinks his general (Kent Smith) is a mighty fine guy. When the general is killed, Ford thinks that, under the circumstances, it's his duty to impersonate the general. Red Buttons, portraying a corporal and friend of Ford, is horrified at the suggestion, but reflecting that "once again we picked the side of panic and confusion," he cooperates. So Ford dons the general's jacket—complete with insignia—and whips the wandering G.I.'s into shape and wins the day, as well as a posthumous medal for the general.

There's more to the story than this, of course, but Director George Marshall makes it all seem like so much fun that you forget how fantastic the plot is and how deadly serious the subject matter could be. William Bowers' script, based on a story by William Chamberlain, is full of bright wisecracks which Glenn Ford and Red Buttons handle in fine style; and the supporting cast are very helpful too, especially Taina Elg as the French girl in the farmhouse that becomes headquarters, Dean Jones as a frightened corporal who's bucked up considerably by the imitation general, John Wilder as a lieutenant who exchanges a wonderful patter of clichés with Ford, and Tige Andrews as a private who hates Ford and has to be controlled by Buttons. Although most of the jokes are verbal, the picture has plenty of action; and Glenn Ford's method for capturing a couple of German tanks is positively inspirational. Anyone who likes to see an institution like the army kidded will enjoy "Imitation General" because in its zany way it often makes good sense.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

COMMUNICATIONS

"THE THIRD WAY"

Des Moines, Ia.

TO THE EDITORS: Your editorial "The Third Way" [June 20] is extremely meaningful in terms of our international relations, but how about at home? Aren't the dissident elements in our own country, in their economic thinking, allowing themselves to fall into the same trap? Those who are concerned over the reports of the Small Business Administration, and the development of corporation-controlled vertical integration do not seem to be aware of the possibilities of "The Third Way"—the cooperative way.

Health and housing point up two examples in other fields. Many Americans can not afford adequate health or housing as it is presently being supplied through "private business"; so they look towards the state as the best means of remedying the situation. Yet there are countless examples, around the nation, of cooperative health organizations and cooperative housing developments that are meeting the need of their members at a cost they can afford.

Closer to home, and not on a "Socialism or Capitalism" basis, are the economic problems of the Catholic community. Father John L. Thomas' book (and pamphlet) *The Catholic Family* points up our situation, which he feels is directly related to our position as a cultural sub-group in a society whose goals and standards are not ours. In the economic sphere the Catholic family finds itself up against peculiar problems. Our American society has established institutions and a cultural pattern to meet needs which flow from *its* philosophy of family life and individual action. This philosophy is often quite different from that held by sanctity-seeking Catholics and their families, with the result that these American cultural institutions and patterns often work against the fulfillment, by the Catholic sub-group, of their married vocation and parental responsibilities.

Father Thomas points out that there are functional requisites for Catholic family life, and that "you cannot pretend to desire an ideal unless you also desire the conditions which make it possible." Is it not possible that in the economic sphere cooperative organization offers a most practical and possible method of providing many of these functional requisites?

Monsignor M. M. Coady and the Saint Francis Xavier Extension Division at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, have already proven the practicality of parish and community adult education and cooperative action. In one fishing village alone, the income of cooperators was increased from their former annual income of two to three hundred dollars to an average gross income of $10,500.

In other areas housing cooperatives have provided their members with four bedroom homes at a cost that, had they been acting as individuals, would have landed them in a planned parenthood two bedroom housing development. Medical cooperatives are doing a remarkable job of reducing the financial drains attendant on the minor ills, cuts, and fractures that plague parents with growing children. Credit unions are annually saving members thousands upon thousands of dollars in credit costs—and encouraging *new* savings in terms of millions.

Today there are state and national organizations

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that can provide the technical "know-how" of cooperative organization. In addition there are already ten million members of credit unions alone, who have some knowledge of the operations and philosophy of a co-operative. Actually it is rather strange that this group has not seen the possibilities of extending the principles credit unions operate on into other fields of family need.

For the Catholic family, however, there is more of an incentive than just building a better mouse trap. The Catholic family is up against economic pressures that are attendant on the very nature of their married vocation. As a cultural sub-group they can not expect society to change overnight; so if their problems are to be solved they will have to solve them themselves. Working together through their parishes and their societies they can. If these families have a common bond, based on a realistic knowledge and love of their faith, they have an instrument at hand, "The Third Way" of cooperative organization. Through their own co-ops they can solve many of their own problems—without losing their individual rights to an all-powerful state, or being dependent on the charity of more fortunate persons.

WILLIAM F. MARTIN.

"THIRTY YEARS OF SALAZAR"

Brooklyn, N. Y.

TO THE EDITORS: As a general rule I find that I respect the positions taken in your articles, even when I disagree, but I must say that Francis E. McMahon's article on Salazar [May 30] seemed incomprehensible. One section in particular baffled me, and were it not for the remainder of the article I would have assumed that a heavy irony was involved.

Mr. McMahon says that "It is to the eternal credit of the Portuguese that they are largely devoid of a sense of racial discrimination. They have difficulty in comprehending why the color of a man's skin should make any difference in social relations." He follows this statement with the sentence: "Among the few score thousands of the 'assimilated' in Angola and Mozambique, a minority have posts of responsibility in the government."

If there is so little racial discrimination, what is the point of the quotation marks around "assimilated"? Are there three classes, the Portuguese, the "assimilated" and the natives? If there is no discrimination, why is there only a "minority" in posts of responsibility? Had this been the end of it, I would have assumed that some very subtle reasoning is involved. But the sentence is followed by these odd examples of the absence of discrimination: "On the debit side Portugal still enforces a policy of limited forced labor. Natives continue to be drafted for work on governmental projects. And, as recently as a few years ago, native workers were periodically forced into the service of Portuguese private entrepreneurs." Are we to believe that the drafting of natives and forced labor go hand in hand with an absence of prejudice? In the old South, Negro slaves nursed white babies. I suppose if you wanted to bend over backwards, you could say that this was to the "eternal credit" of the slaveowners.

J. T. MCCARTIN.

REPLY

Chicago, Ill.

TO THE EDITORS: There is a form of discrimination in the Portuguese colonies, but the point is that it is largely cultural in character, not racial. So long as the native inhabitant has not attained the status of an *assimilado* (this technical term, which I turned into English, has no sinister connotation), he is subject to a distinctive code. He must, for example, carry a working card and prove that he has been employed for a specified number of months per year. Sometimes he fulfills this quota through forced labor. The Portuguese theorize that the habit of steady work must be acquired in achieving the civilized state. Whatever one may say about the theory, the system in practice has led to serious abuses.

I suppose it is true to say that there are three classes of people in the colonies, but this does not mean there is racial discrimination. The great difficulty has been the slowness of the process of integration.

FRANCIS E. MCMAHON.

THE FRENCH

Cambridge, Mass.

TO THE EDITORS: In a remarkable recent study of André Gide, Jean Delay defines as a state of "morbid equanimity" Gide's acceptance, in late maturity, of the conflicting tendencies which inhabited him. Its basic ambiguity offers a striking parallel with the present political temper of the French. As unstable as in the days of Julius Caesar, it would seem that political maturity rests, for them, in the acceptance of this ineradicable trait. They may not want Napoleon back in the avatar of General de Gaulle; yet the Napoleonic cult persists. When asked how to account for its survival in this democratic age a French friend answered dreamily, "Ah! What one man can do!" Of democracy itself E. M. Cioran, in a recent issue of *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, wrote: "That marvel of the age! What has it brought us? It is at once the paradise and the grave of a people. Life without it is unthinkable; but it has no life." A thoroughly Gidean ambivalence, with which many Frenchmen would no doubt concur.

THEODORE CHANLER.

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To the half-learned in psychology, her letters offer a number of pitfalls

The Real Emily Dickinson

by HORACE GREGORY

SINCE THE first posthumous publication of her poems in 1890, few poets have been admired for the wrong reasons with louder cheers of critical ecstasy than has Emily Dickinson. The true picture of her life and work had been distorted—not by her first editor, Thomas Wentworth Higginson—but by those who rediscovered her poetry between 1914 and 1935. By them she was regarded as an essentially "modern" poet, divorced, for the moment at least, from the transcendental tradition in New England out of which the best of her poems came to light. She was interpreted as a "metaphysical poet," or, at an opposite extreme, as "a rebel, tipsy in the sun." Feverish biographers searched through hundreds of her short poems in the futile effort to find a hidden lover. With his earlier edition of her poems and now with his edition of *Letters of Emily Dickinson* (Harvard. 3 vols. $25.), Thomas H. Johnson has brought sanity out of violent speculation and disorder.

However limited in its areas of emotion, Emily Dickinson's poetic gift remains timeless, penetrating, aphoristic. She was an "original," but this is not to say that she was a consciously experimental artist. Her artistry came in the deft use of assonance, and in a strict economy of phrase and image. She did not trouble her mind with conventional rules of punctuation; dashes, exclamation points, question marks, a few commas and periods sufficed for her. With these she successfully evolved a style, and one might say that many of her four-line stanzas were in effect a finely tempered exercise in short-hand, so quickening, so urgent that she scarcely found breath for speech.

OUT OF the writing of many letters came Emily Dickinson's poems, and in 1842 at the age of twelve, in a letter to her brother Austin, she made the first step in her sheltered, zealously guarded literary career. Her letters from that date onward to her death in the spring of 1886 provide (as do Hopkins' letters to A.W.M. Baillie, Robert Bridges, and R. W. Dixon) the essential documents toward an understanding of the poems. She, her mother and her sister, Lavinia, were devout home-livers; her father, a busy, able New England lawyer, gave the household an air of well-secured authority: nothing, so it appears, could have breached its walls.

Emily's year of schooling at Mount Holyoke in South Hadley, away from her home in Amherst, gave her recurrent hours of intense homesickness. In a letter to her friend, Abiah Root, she wrote, "gratitude rose in my heart to God, for granting me such a safe return to my *own* DEAR HOME," nor does her love for her home in Amherst conceal a desire to reform it, or to make it something other than what it was.

Homesick as she so frequently became, it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of her brief stays at Mount Holyoke. "I love this Seminary & all the teachers are bound strongly to my heart by ties of affection." At seventeen Emily's responses were unfailingly enthusiastic—for she was an enthusiast in very nearly a theological sense of the word. Euclid, algebra, physiology, Pope's "Essay on Man," Goldsmith on ancient history, practice at the piano, a dinner of roast veal, squash and potatoes were all listed as though each were graced with beatific glory. If Mount Holyoke lacked her deeply felt need for the securities of "HOME," it opened doors that were never closed again.

At Mount Holyoke came her introduction to readings in a broader range of subjects than she was likely to discuss at the family mid-day meal—and among them were poems and novels written by living writers. After leaving the Seminary she continued and expanded her readings in current verse and fiction. She was alert to the best writings of her contemporaries—with one exception: "Mr. Whitman's Book," which she had been told was "disgraceful," she never read. Her lists swept through the writings of Tennyson, George Eliot, Dickens, Emerson, De Quincey, Longfellow, both the Brownings—and one of her last discoveries was *The Europeans* by Henry James.

Her profounder readings were in Shakespeare, even through his less popular plays, "Coriolanus" and "King Lear." The Bible was of course *her* Bible, and the number of her references to the New Testament is greater than to the Old. Observations of nature as she read them from the windows of her home, the Bible, Shakespeare were sources of inspiration in her letters

Mr. Gregory is co-author of *A History of American Poetry, 1900-1940*, and co-editor of the *Mentor Book of Religious Verse*.

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and poems. From them she learned to polish the edges of her wit, to endow her aphorisms with memorable sharpness. At twenty she was not merely well-schooled, well-read, but was instinctively prepared to guide the genius she possessed.

TO THE unwary, and particularly those who are half-learned in the use of psychological terms, Emily Dickinson's letters offer a number of pitfalls. Because of her exclamatory style which made her pen seem to talk aloud on paper, the temptation is to read more *into* her letters than they contain. Her letters to her friend, Abiah Root, and later to Susan Gilbert, who was to become her brother Austin's wife, are written in the language of school-girl "crushes." It would also be possible to read *into* them signs of incipient Lesbianism. But having read so far in that direction, what is one to say of the equally "school-girlish-crush" letters written to Otis P. Lord, who was a respectable (and married) New England judge? It is better to conclude in agreement with her editor Thomas H. Johnson that the Reverend Charles Wadsworth was an image of "meaningful associations" in her imagination. I believe that speculations of this kind are of less significance (since she eloped with no one, either male or female) than two sentences in a letter to her brother, dated April 12th 1853: "I wish we were children now. I wish we were *always* children, how to grow up I don't know."

It is difficult to refute the sincerity of her wish in which the underlining of *"always"* takes on stressed meanings. Her statement is consistent with the school-girlish gush with which she addressed certain of her friends; it is consistent with her retreats to the upper floors of the Dickinson house, simulating child-like shyness, consistent with her refusal to assume adult responsibilities, and with her dislike of places away from Amherst. In Emily Dickinson's theology, child-likeness was close to God-likeness: that conviction kept her visions of "Father Mortality" or death, nature, immortality, and God clear, direct and vividly perceived.

The best of her letters were written to her brother; they are less coy than to others, at ease, and relatively calm. As she praises him for his literary imagination and his wit, one feels that she is also thinking of her own determination to write supremely well. In the early 1860's her writing of letters gave way to the writing of a great rush of poems: the stream came at full tide. By 1874 the brilliant flow was at an end.

Emily Dickinson's famous correspondence and meeting with T. W. Higginson, whose literary advice she sought, reveal (supplemented by his impressions of her published after her death) her frightening aspect to the worldly, the mediocre, the benevolent. She did not intend, of course, to frighten them, least of all Mr. Higginson. He wrote of her "reddish hair," her face "with no good feature," her hand extended to his, offering "two day lilies" to him, her "breathless childlike voice." He noted "an excess of tension and of an abnormal life." In her presence and in her house, he felt "as one does in the woods." He was kindly; he was not shocked, but consciously embarrassed.

Mr. Higginson was a good man, and not entirely unperceptive. He could be trusted. After her death, he was her first editor. Yet he represented an American attitude in which the extraordinary is often dismissed as unhealthy or merely eccentric. In American poetry the unlooked for and uncalled for must often await its understanding and recognition.

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THE BELLIGERENT NEUTRALS

IN THE FALL of 1953, along with Harold Fey, now editor of the *Christian Century,* and Rabbi Morris Lazaron of the *Jewish Newsletter,* I traveled throughout the Middle East. The three of us spent long hours every day, both in Israel and the Moslem lands, interviewing their leaders and simple folk alike. I came back feeling that nothing could stop the twentieth-century revolution in the Arab countries. To try to stop it, I wrote, was like trying to stop the rising of the morning sun. For, to fall back on an American colloquialism, the simple fact is that the Arabs have had it. After years and years of domination by Western imperial powers and centuries of poverty and political impotence, they are now making demands.

The Arabs feel that they have no stake in the current East-West, Communist-capitalist struggle. Some of their leaders, like the Egyptian dictator Nasser, are determined, however, to benefit from the struggle. Both sides, East and West, think they need Middle East oil. Both sides need Arab support. As these leaders see it, an Arab world thoroughly committed to one side or the other can only lose. They have no faith in the promises of the West. What, they will ask you, did Western imperialism offer them during all the years that it held sway over the destinies of Arab lands? They emerged from that endless experience poverty-ridden, ignorant and impotent in a world where wealth, knowledge and power call the turn.

But though they are cynical about the ringing cold-war slogans of the Western powers, they are no more bemused by Russian promises. There is very little actual Communist sympathy in the Middle East. The rigidities of Marxist doctrine have no appeal for the dreamy absolutists of the Islamic world. The Arabs have no illusions about Soviet imperialism. The general feeling throughout educated circles in the area is that for the Arabs to line up with one side or the other in any final way would be to throw away their present bargaining power. So the rallying cry is nationalism and self-determination. Caught between the slogans of Communism and the propaganda of the so-called free world (which the Arabs do not think of as a freedom-giving world), the leaders of the Middle East cry for pan-Arabism. Such cries have immense popular appeal. They account for Nasser's popularity. He has been shrewd enough to give the impression he is creating a gigantic third force. Arab "neutrality," in this sense of the word, explains the fact that the United States has no leverage power in the Middle East, as one highly placed diplomat put it.

At least for purposes of analysis, the Middle Eastern problem can be detached from the cold war. Even if there were no conflict between Russia and the allied powers, the Middle East would be a problem. It would be a problem because of the area's extreme poverty, outmoded social system and lack of education. Under the best of circumstances the fulfilling of the Arabs' legitimate ambitions would not be easily attained. The cold war however is an unavoidable factual element. It complicates the problem almost infinitely. The presence of Israel, child of the West and in the eyes of its neighbors a usurper of Arab rights in the Middle East, adds to the complexity. For even the most ardent pro-Western Arab leaders are anti-Israel.

Two of these leaders were caught up in the Iraqi revolution. It happens that during our tour of the Middle East we interviewed both of them. I remember our interview with Fadhil Jamali, sometime Prime Minister of Iraq. Dr. Jamali was a graduate of Columbia, married to an American woman. He was strongly anti-Communist. He was greatly sympathetic to the aims of the U.S. But he was also fanatically anti-Israel. He thought the Jewish State should be utterly destroyed and said baldly there would be no peace in the Middle East until it was only a memory. Dr. Jamali, first reported to have been killed along with King Faisal, is now said to have been captured and imprisoned.

I remember well the day we interviewed King Faisal, the young monarch of Iraq. He was educated in England and spoke in a clipped British public school accent. He too was pro-West. Of course, he formally identified himself with the Arabs—but his schooling told: he was a young British gentleman in his manner and in his outlook. He spoke bitterly against Communism and Russia. And he was just as bitter about Israel.

The rabbi, though counted as an anti-Zionist in American circles, tried to temper the young monarch's anti-Israel feelings. He spoke to him in warm human terms of the Israeli people and of the need for mutual tolerance and respect between Jew and Arab. The king was visibly moved by the rabbi's sincerity. Finally, when we were about to leave, Rabbi Lazaron asked the king if, as a gesture of good will and common humanity, he might offer him a rabbinical blessing. The king agreed readily and bowed his head.

When we left the palace, Rabbi Lazaron wept a little. He was weeping because of all the misery and misunderstanding in the world, he told me. Most of all he wept for the young king. "That boy," he said sadly, "will never live to see his thirtieth birthday. He is caught up in the world's misery. He is doomed."

King Faisal was only twenty-three when he was shot dead by a palace guard. JOHN COGLEY.

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Present-day Irish Rebels

A TERRIBLE BEAUTY. By Arthur J. Roth. Farrar, Straus. $3.95.

By DAVID H. GREENE

A REVIEWER for the *Times Literary Supplement* recently noted that while contemporary verse writing in Ireland had a homely, easy, rough-and-ready manner, English verse was moving in the opposite direction of smoothness, tightness, and academic allusiveness. Arthur J. Roth's *A Terrible Beauty,* as well as the work of other recent Irish novelists like Walter Macken and Michael McLaverty, make one feel that the judgment could be broadened to cover more than verse. Nobody would pretend that present-day Irish writers can compare with England's crop of angry young men or that the heroic period of Irish writing has not passed. But if Irish novelists should not be compared with their English colleagues one might at least ask why, like the poets, they seem to be going in a different direction, mostly a stationary one if one will permit the Irish bull.

The English novel today, in the hands of a Kingsley Amis or a John Wain, is a modern instrument. The Irish novel is old-fashioned. It may have its own moments of triumph, but it strikes one as being homely in design and construction and easy-going, sometimes to the point of disaster. Irish novelists give little evidence of having read James Joyce, much less other moderns, to see how the form of the novel has been altered to appease—or to irritate—contemporary sensibilities.

A Terrible Beauty takes its title from a poem of Yeats' eulogizing the heroes of the Easter Rising of 1916. But the I.R.A. men of Mr. Roth's novel are present-day Irish rebels—the action takes place during World War II—and Yeats' words have an ironic application to them. The Irish insurgents who planted bombs in English post-offices during the early days of World War II and who have continued to raid police barracks along the Ulster border since then have had little sympathy from the outside world and mild but continuous harassment from their own government. There is no way of knowing how much sympathy for them there is in the hearts of the Irish people. Mr. Roth leaves the question open, though his own position is quite clear.

The ingredients of *A Terrible Beauty* are neither very terrible nor very beautiful, which is what the author intended: a small Irish town just over the border in Northern Ireland, a philosophical cobbler who watches with gentle disapproval the activities of the local conspirators, a kindly police sergeant unwilling to move against the local boys and their clumsy plotting, a rebel leader of warped mind and twisted body, two priests with different atitudes toward Ireland's destiny, and finally the hero, his girl and his family. The hero, an uncomplicated farm youth with simple loyalties, is gradually involved in the movement and in a raid on a military barracks—far more effective than any actual I.R.A. raid—the shooting of an innocent girl, disillusionment and flight from the country.

Most notable is the description of a wake. "Four men were gathered round the corpse, two of them sitting on the bed and two sitting on chairs that were drawn up alongside. Old Anne was sitting up in the bed. The rosary had been taken out of her hands and her arms were stretched out straight on the white sheet. A man was dealing out five hands of poker, one each for the four players and one for the corpse." In another room of the house mourners are regaled with a funny story which Chaucer or Boccaccio would have been delighted to know. "Some of the sober ones decided it wouldn't be safe—the ass might kick his brains out and the one kick would have done it—so instead they put him to sleep in the asses' shed and locked the ass in the kitchen . . . Old Mickey . . . thinking it the son, draws back his foot, kicks the ass and roars at him, 'You drunken old sot! Have you no shame, going to sleep there on the floor!' The ass isn't used to having his rest disturbed so he lashes out and kicks back."

Telling a story, particularly a funny one, is a talent Irish novelists have, and it may be just as well that most of them stick to the age-old formula: uncomplicated narrative, comic relief, formalized descriptions of places, and types that everyone recognizes and expects. Mr. Roth's deep knowledge of his native milieu, his narrative skill, and his wit, one trusts, will enable him to write other novels which do not depend so much on materials which for an Irishman come too easily to hand.

Introduction to Recent History

THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. By Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. Beacon. $6.75.

By MICHAEL HARRINGTON

THIS NEW book on the American Communist Party fulfills a very real need: it provides an excellent introduction to a topic which has been central to many of the domestic political debates of the past decade. It is not as comprehensive and as scholarly as Theodore Draper's brilliant *Roots of American Communism* (that study, the first of two, ended in the twenties; *The American Communist Party* covers the entire period of 1919 to 1957), but rather complementary to it. The authors are more journalistic in their treatment, more political in their approach, than Draper, but this allows their analysis to be accessible to a wider audience.

But perhaps the major merit of this new book is that it puts the

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question of the Communist Party into some kind of a historical and political perspective. For one thing, the authors understand the essential political link between the American Communists and the Russians. The "Stalinization" of the Party, its transformation from an honest expression of American radicalism into the political agency of Moscow's foreign policy, can only be understood in terms of the development of the Russian Revolution itself. And yet there was another dimension to this change. For of all parties, the American Party was, in a very real sense, the most easily Stalinized. Even before the victory of Stalin in Russia, American Communists had surrendered their right to make decisions to the Communist International. Weak, often isolated by sectarianism, they became almost completely dependent upon the Russians—and when the *Vohzd* took over, it was a simple matter to turn this dependence into slavish submission.

And yet this political link should not be confused with the Russian espionage apparatus. The overwhelming majority of American Communists, as Howe and Coser well point out, were not part of a spy ring. They had been attracted to the Party for a variety of reasons—some through idealism, some through their own personal inadequacies, and so on—and for the most part they were the political instruments of Russian policy, but not spies. This conception, sharply at variance with the one put forward by Sidney Hook in his *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No!*, puts American Communism into a historical perspective. It puts an end to the nonsense that the Party constituted a "clear and present danger" in an insurrectionary sense (as Vinson's tortured decision argued in the Dennis case); it confronts the conspiracy thesis with the complexities of reality.

Another value of this study is that it also relates the Party's development to actual happenings in American society. The early days are seen in terms of the strike wave of 1919; the thirties against the background of the Popular Front, the rise of fascism, and the New Deal. Here again, so many people in the last decade have refused this necessary investigation, and considered the Party (and Party membership) as if it were simply demonic. *The American Communist Party* is a welcome antidote to this kind of thinking. In the new climate of civil liberties, it may have a very good effect indeed.

Today, the Communist Party is a sect, without influence on the labor or liberal movements, shattered by the revelations of Mr. Khrushchev and the murderous reality of Russian imperialism in Hungary. Yet, we must still attempt to understand. For one thing, the Party played a role which cannot be estimated in terms of its numbers alone, and we must learn why. For another, there are good people who were tragically duped by their commitment who must be reintegrated into the democratic movement, whose sincerity and idealism should find a real way of expression. A reading of this new study will help, I think, in both of these tasks.

As history, then, this is a first-rate introduction to a stormy and important subject; as politics, it is a needed corrective to the oversimplifications of the past decade. Anyone concerned with the recent political past will find Howe and Coser's study an extremely valuable contribution, one certainly worth the reading.

Destiny of a Hero

THE KING MUST DIE. By Mary Renault. Pantheon. $4.50.

By EDWIN KENNEBECK

THIS—the eighth novel of Mary Renault—is a lively story of the hero Theseus. Limited to the earlier part of his legend, up to his return to Athens from Minos and Naxos, it is chiefly a story of adventure, but a mature one, strongly permeated with a sense of destiny, the hero's constant preoccupation being with his *moira*, his fate. Theseus knows that when one

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acknowledges, as far as he is able, the extent and limitation of his *moira,* he is as free as it is possible to be; one cannot escape the reckoning, but until the day comes for which it is ordained, nothing can vanquish him. The important thing is to submit to destiny. "It is not the sacrifice, whether it comes in youth or age, or the god remits it; it is not the bloodletting that calls down power," says his grandfather, Pittheus, King of Troizen. "It is the consenting, Theseus. The readiness is all. It washes heart and mind from things of no account, and leaves them open to the god." Thus it is, according to Miss Renault's picture, that this great hero was able to survive the numerous ordeals along his way.

Unlike the Theseus of André Gide's story, this Theseus does not belittle the challenges he has met. Miss Renault, instead of trivializing the fantastic legends, attempts to give full justice to the hero's natural powers, and to indicate how, even at the time when his exploits occurred, they could begin to assume the colors and dimensions of legend. Needless to say, Theseus' natural powers are, even in this modern retelling, remarkable indeed, as are those of most adventure heroes, and along his path auspicious coincidences abound. But they are not meant to be either miracles, magic, or mere tricks—though Theseus himself is often reverently grateful to the gods for them.

Unlike the cerebral, placid center around which revolves Marguerite Yourcenar's *Hadrian's Memoirs,* or the slightly eccentric spinning pattern of Ernst Schnabel's tale of Odysseus in *The Voyage Home,* the basic line of *The King Must Die* is uncomplicated and horizontal—one exploit after another, with each of which the hero's strength and self-knowledge increase. It ends, thus, with a round, full picture of the real beginning of King Theseus' manhood soon after a climactic, shuddery version of the story of Ariadne on Naxos, a scene of Dionysian celebrations, obliquely rendered and awful.

Miss Renault's episodes are described often with a beguiling use of indirection, assumption, offhand reference to details that make the scenes startlingly immediate. Here is "the Lady Medea" at the palace of King Aegeus: "She was neither of the Hellenes nor of the Shore Folk; her face was broad, the nose a little flat, the eyes narrow and slanted outward. She had a subtle mouth, curving and closed on a secret smile. Her brow, which was low and white, was crowned with a diadem a hand's breadth deep of gold flowers and leaves; gold flower buds on golden chains fell down each side among the streams of her strong black hair."

Miss Renault has a vigorous sense of the life and variety of the cities and personalities of the era, and renders them without a trace of effort or monotony. The language in which she has Theseus tell his story is not elaborate, but it has elegance and pace; consistently clear, this story does not have such complicated passages on politics and philosophies as sometimes blur *The Last of the Wine,* her very interesting novel of a later Greece. Theseus is a bold and shrewd young man, much attracted to women and much endowed with a quickness of decision and dramatic sense of gesture that enable him to lead men successfully. Miss Renault, from her modern vantage point of psychological sophistication, gives him a simple but sure insight into human behavior.

At Knossus, having volunteered to go along with the other youths and maidens demanded as a tribute from Athens by King Minos, Theseus becomes part of the band of prisoners dedicated as "sacrifices" to the Bull God. Instead of their being killed and offered, the practice is that they become teams who perform dangerous acrobatic feats with bulls in an arena for the mere amusement of the spectators. Miss Renault's reconstruction, through her narrator, of the psychology of the teams, each member depending for his life on the skill and courage of the others, is a remarkable blend of research, style, and imagination—as, indeed, is the entire story.

The Second Phase

THE ANCIENT LIBRARY OF QUMRAN AND MODERN BIBLICAL STUDIES. By Frank Moore Cross, Jr. Doubleday. $4.50.

By JOSEPH A. FITZMYER

OF THE making of many books there is no end." The words of Qoheleth may justly be applied to the Dead Sea Scrolls today. But because there is no end of the many ordinary books on the Scrolls, it is a pleasure to recommend one with a refreshing and sound approach.

The *Ancient Library of Qumran* is an excellent second-phase book on the Scrolls. Earlier books dealt mainly with the seven great manuscripts from Qumran Cave One and were written by authors who either derived their information at second hand or who were, like Millar Burrows, connected with the initial discovery. Dr. Cross, however, is a member of the international and intercredal team engaged in the publication of the tens of thousands of manuscript fragments from Qumran Cave Four. His work for several years on these fragments has given him first-hand access to unpublished material of wide variety and has thus enabled him to present a more comprehensive and more reliable interpretation of the Qumran discoveries. Like Fr. Jozef T. Milik's *Dix ans de découvertes dans le Désert de Juda* (soon to appear in English), Dr. Cross' book introduces the general public to second-phase literature on the Scrolls. It is in his thorough and balanced use of the new material from Cave Four together with the archaeological data supplied by Père de Vaux's excavations at the Qumran community center that we find the fresh approach.

The most significant contribution made by the book to progress in the study of the scrolls is the careful correlation of the archaeological and palaeographical data with the internal evidence of the texts themselves and with the information about the Essenes supplied by ancient writers (Josephus, Philo,

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Pliny the Elder, Hippolytus and Dio Chrysostom). We can only say "Amen" to his convincing reasons for the identification of the people of Qumran as an apocalyptic sect of Essenes, conscious of their priestly heritage and solicitous to live as perfectly as possible in their desert retreat. The beginnings of the Essene movement are traced back to the Maccabaean revolt and specifically to the Hasidim. The archaeological and paleographical data show conclusively that the *floruit* of the Righteous Teacher, who may be regarded as the founder of the sect, was about 150 B. C. All other identifications of the sect as Pharisaic, Zealot or Ebionite are now excluded. In this regard Dr. Cross has all the other members of the Jerusalem team working on the Scrolls on his side.

Of the five chapters in the book (Discovery of an Ancient Library; The Essenes, the People of the Scrolls; the Righteous Teacher and Essene Origins; The Old Testament at Qumran; The Essenes and the Primitive Church) the best are undoubtedly the second and the fourth —but the latter is quite technical— while the weakest is the last. The reason for this is that Dr. Cross is primarily an Old Testament scholar and is editing the Biblical manuscripts from Cave Four. In the final chapter he is out of his field and his contribution is sketchy and superficial; a much better job could have been done in this area. However, what is said there is not sensational and, as far as it goes, is reliable.

Dr. Cross, who is Professor of Old Testament at Harvard Divinity School, delivered the Haskell Lectures for 1956-57 to the Graduate School of Theology at Oberlin College in March 1957. "The text of the lectures was written with public presentation in view," but in the book it has been expanded with extensive foot-noting "for the usual purposes of documentation" and "to enable the writer to elaborate on the restricted material suitable to his text." In general, the combination has been a happy one, for the documentation permits the reader to check and control the author's interpretation, according to his interest and inclination. But the ordinary reader will be well advised to concentrate on the main text. For all its readable qualities, Dr. Cross' book is not the one to be given to someone desirous of making a first acquaintance with the Scrolls. His book presupposes an already general acquaintance with them; it may profitably be used as a corrective to many of the more sensational writings on the Scrolls. The knowledgeable reader can only profit from a serious perusal of this highly commendable book on the Qumran discoveries.

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David H. Greene is a member of the faculty of New York University and a specialist in Irish literature.

Michael Harrington writes on literary and political matters for various magazines.

Edwin Kennebeck is a member of a well-known New York publishing house.

Father Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., has just returned from Jerusalem where he was engaged in work on the Dead Sea Scrolls.

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The Commonweal

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Then and Now

Under present conditions, nuclear war might prevent the tragedy of enslavement, and that is certainly part of our national policy. But nuclear warfare would in itself be a tragedy. Here, it seems to us, is the heart of the Administration weakness on the problem of peace and war. And in fairness it must be said that in this weakness the Administration only reflects the history and traditions, the fears and aspirations of the American people.

In spite of the history of the past fifteen years, we in America are temperamentally unprepared for the historic role that has been thrust upon us. We want things black and white, we want our allies unquestioning and our enemies unmistakable. We demand unconditional surrenders and look for a quick return to "normalcy."

The United States and the world have survived such conduct in the past. It cannot be counted on that they will do so in the future. If global war is to be avoided—as it should be—and if Communist aggression is to be halted—as it should be—this nation cannot rely chiefly upon nuclear weapons, as we are now doing. To use them rashly is to open a Pandora's box and chance the terrible responsibility of loosing hydrogen war upon the world.

What course, then, is open to a peace-loving and freedom-loving people? We must shift our emphasis away from total reliance on nuclear weapons. We must be prepared to fight a series of small wars on the borders of the free world, perhaps for the next fifty years, and we must do so without yielding to the temptation to use quick and easy nuclear weapons. The burdens of such a shift in national policy are, admittedly, heavy in money and in manpower. But in the other direction lies disaster, for us and for the world.

—The Commonweal, April 1, 1955

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